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1The Problem of Evil and its Solution
The problem of evil can be captured by the following four statements which taken 
together are inconsistent:
(1) God made the world
(2) God is a perfect being
(3) A perfect being would not create a world containing evil
(4) The world contains evil
Traditional attempts to grapple with this problem typically center on rejecting (3).  
Thus Descartes, following Augustine, rejects (3), arguing that evil is the result of 
man’s exercise of his free will. However, given Descartes plausible claim that 
God could have created man in such a way that through exercising his free will 
man comes to only virtuous actions, it is not clear how the problem is solved.  
Descartes also repeats the Augustinian orthodoxy that though the world contains 
evil it does not contain it as a positive existence; evil has no real being but is 
simply the reflection of the inherent lack of full-being in merely finite individuals. 
Again, that this is a solution is open to serious doubt.  
Descartes briefly canvasses the Augustinian suggestion that the world 
only appears to contain evil and that seen from the right perspective (God’s 
perspective) the appearance of evil vanishes.1 This view suffers from the fact that 
it is near impossible to imagine a perspectival point from which all the evil so 
apparent to us no longer appears so.  For Voltaire the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 
precluded this possibility.2  I prefer to take the horrors of Europe in the period 
from 1939-45 as a paradigm of non-perspectival evil.
2Gnostics have attempted to solve the conundrum by rejecting (1), arguing 
that the world is the creation not of God but of a lesser demiurge, archon, or 
angels.  This is the position taken by Basilides who worshipped a primal “non-
existent” God and, according to Irenaeus, argued that it was not Jesus but Simon 
of Cyrene who died on the cross. Still it leaves us with the problem of who 
created the demiurge and why God did not supplement or prevent this 
demiurge’s work.3
I wish here to canvass a solution that I have yet to find in the literature and 
one I take to be more satisfying and less evasive then those mentioned above.
Grant me that each of God’s thoughts is both complete and has some 
grade of reality.  Now God has had all possible thoughts.  Given our previous two 
assumptions this amounts to the claim that God has thought all possible worlds 
in their entirety.  Indeed we may take each possible world just to be one of God’s 
thoughts. So far this is nothing more than Leibnizean orthodoxy – see, for 
example Leibniz’s Monadology, paragraph 43. 4  Now consider the world we 
know and inhabit.  It is a possible world, hence one that God has thought of.  
Furthermore, our world pretty clearly, pace Descartes, contains evil.  Now God 
being perfect would not create a world containing evil.  Ergo God did not create 
this world, he merely thought of it.  Our world then is a merely possible world, 
one God thought of but chose not to create. Presumably it was his knowledge of 
the evil in this world which led him to decide that it was beneath creation. The 
actual world is some other world that contains none of the evil of this world or any 
other possible world.5
3Which then of the four premises does this solution reject.  A number of 
responses are viable here.  We can say that this solution rejects (1) taking the 
phrase ‘the world’ as it occurs in (1) to refer to this non-actual possible world. 
Here we would be claiming that God merely thought of this world but he did not 
make it in the sense of choosing to create it. God did give substantiality to one of 
the possible worlds, to one of his thoughts, our world however is not that world. 
Alternatively, we can say this solution rejects (4) taking the phrase ‘the world’ as 
it occurs in (4) to refer to the world God chose to actualize, a world that is not this 
one we inhabit, but a world that contains no evil. Rather than explicitly rejecting 
(1) or (4) I prefer to see this as a case of ambiguity: All of (1)-(4) are true. The 
phrase “the world” as it occurs in (1) refers to the actual world which is not the 
world we inhabit.6  “The world” as it occurs in (4) refers to this world, a merely 
possible, non-actual, world. Disambiguated and expanded a little the four 
premises read as follows
(1*) God created the actual world (and merely thought of the other possible 
worlds)
(2) God is a perfect being
(3*) A perfect being would not create, that is, make actual, a world containing evil
(4*) This world, a possible non-actual world, contains evil
These four claims are jointly consistent. However this solution exploits a 
Liebnizian perspective that is not popular among certain current possible world 
theorists. It takes actuality to be defined from God’s point of view and thus rejects 
the kind of indexical account of actuality favored, for instance, by David Lewis. 
4For Lewis (4*) is false in each possible world, since for any given world W the 
claim “This world is actual” is true in W, actuality being indexed to worlds.  Hence 
for Lewis (4*) is necessarily false.  It is perhaps worth pausing here to note that 
this leads to the, arguably, infelicitous result that ‘This world is actual’ is a 
necessary truth.  For Liebniz (4*) is true in some worlds and false in at least one 
world.  In fact the Lewisian account is not congenial to theism since, in 
combination with theism, it leads to the following dilemma: Either God exists in 
each possible world in which case we reintroduce the problem of evil since God 
would then exist in worlds containing evil. Or, on the other hand, if we take God 
to exist in some, but not all, worlds it seems then that there could be a greater 
being, namely one who did exist in all possible worlds.  However if, contra Lewis, 
we allow for the notion of non-wordly existence, though reserving it for God 
alone, this allows us to avoid the notion of God coexisting with evil.  
Furthermore, it allows for a sense of God’s existence that is not diminished by 
being limited to only some worlds.  As noted above, a God who exists in some 
worlds but not in others seems to have a lesser existence then one who exists in 
all worlds.  On the other hand, an extra-wordly God who is the source of all 
worlds, some worlds having existence merely as his thoughts, others having 
existence as a matter of divine creation, is in no way diminished by not having 
wordly existence. Furthermore the idea of God as an extra-wordly existent has 
the inestimable virtue of fitting such scripture as Is. 43.24, Rev. 5.11, Cor. 8.6, 
Col. 1.16 and Maccabees 7.28.  In particular, Hebrews 11.3, “[t]hrough faith we 
5understand the worlds were framed by the word of God”, lends further credence 
to the idea that God is the extra-wordly creator of all worlds  
While ours is a genuine solution to the problem of evil, I do have qualms.  
In particular, it is not clear to me that this world really is a possible world.  It may 
1well be an impossible world. An impossible world is a world in which some 
contradiction is true; it is a world God never thought of.  If, pace the above 
solution, (1)-(4) are in fact jointly true of this world, so that ‘the world’ in (1) and 
(4) refers to this, our, world, then this world is an impossible world. The claim that 
this world is an impossible world of which (1)-(4) are all true is, presumably, to be 
preferred to the abomination of atheism. 7
                                                
6Endnotes
                                                
1 The free will, non-existence, and perspectival “solutions” are all, briefly, 
canvassed, with specific reference to the problem of error, in Descartes 
Meditations on First Philosophy, edited and translated by John Cottingham,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. For Descartes, error and evil are 
of a kind in the sense that both are, prima facie, incompatible with God’s 
perfection. Augustine while generally adhering to a combination of the free will 
and non-existence solutions does occasionally advocate the perspectival solution 
– see, for instance, Confessions VII, 13 & 15.
2 See his Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne.
3  There is some controversy over the exact nature of Basilides views. The major 
historic sources on Basilides, namely Hippolytus, Clement, Origen, and Iraneaus 
give conflicting accounts of his thought.  For more on this see Kurt Rudolph’s Die 
Gnosis: Wesen und Geschicte einer Spätantiken Religion, Koeher & Amelang, 
Leipzig, 1977. Borges’s attribution to Basilides of a cosmology of 365 Gods, each 
a lesser creation of his predecessor, and such that “[t]he L-rd of the lowest 
heaven is that of the scriptures and his fraction of divinity tends towards zero” is 
profound and probably erroneous.
4  Cf. The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings, translated by Robert 
Latta, O.U.P., Lodnon, 1898. I pause here to note that if we take God to be a 
being who exists outside of all possible worlds, a claim endorsed by Leibniz (see 
below), we can give some sense to Basilides aforementioned view that God is 
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non-existent.  He is non-existent in the sense that he does not have worldly 
existence.
5  Of course, in a trivial sense this world, the world we inhabit, is actual for us. 
The point here is that from God’s perspective, hence as a matter of absolute fact, 
it need not be the actual world. For Leibniz the actual world is simply that one of 
the possible worlds that God chose to make substantial. 
6 I allow that we may have counterparts in the actual world.
7 In my forthcoming  “Impossible Worlds Semantics” I canvass the formal, though 
not theological, advantages of doing away with possible worlds and 
countenancing merely impossible worlds. 
